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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 782a-3(2)(j) and the Supreme Court's transfer order of May 15, 2006.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

In a case arising from an intra-family dispute involving closely-held

limited partnerships, was it erroneous to grant summary judgment when:
a)

the district court based its conclusion on a finding that all the

claims asserted were derivative (i) despite evidence that Plaintiff was
uniquely harmed; and (ii) despite the judicial dissolution/accounting requests
made by Plaintiff; and
b)

the court refused to invoke an exception allowing limited

partners to pursue derivative claims in closely-held partnerships.
2.

Did the district court err in refusing to reconsider its summary

judgment decision to allow Plaintiffs judicial dissolution claim to go forward
when such a claim is, by definition, not derivative?
3.

Did the district court err in declaring Plaintiff s motion to amend

"moot" when Plaintiff sought to allege futility of demand so it could proceed with
its claims derivatively?

1

Standard of Review
Because all these matters were decided in the context of summary judgment,
review is de novo, with no deference given to the district court's legal
interpretation. See, e.g., State v. Straight, 2004 UT 88, f 5, 108 P.3d 690 (Utah
2004). All of the foregoing issues were addressed by the district court's summary
judgment orders, R. at 432-38; 578-80, and thus are preserved for review.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 48-2a-1003:

In a derivative action, the complaint shall set forth with particularity the
effort of the plaintiff to secure initiation of the action by a general partner or
the reasons for not making the effort.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below.

This case arises from an intra-family dispute involving closely-held limited
partnerships. Merline Learning is the majority owner of Plaintiff GLFP1, which is
an equal owner (along with an entity controlled by Ms. Learning's brother,
Defendant Howard Clark) of Defendant Clark Learning Properties. R. at 265.
1

GLFP was established initially as a limited partnership, and was so classified in
the Complaint. However, it was converted to a limited liability company on
July 28, 2004. This conversion did not alter Merline Learning's status as the
primary owner. The Court granted summaiy judgment before Plaintiff could
correct the case caption to reflect that GLFP had been converted to a limited
liability company. See R. at 253, 265.
2

Howard Clark is the managing partner of Defendant CL Management, Ltd. which
in turn is the managing partner of Clark Learning Properties, Ltd. Id. The
remaining defendant below, H. Scott Clark, is the son of Howard Clark.
GLFP filed suit against Clark Learning Properties, CL Management and the
Clarks, as individuals, in the Third Judicial District Court on February 8, 2005. R.
1. GLFP asserted claims for (a) damages for breach offiduciaryduty against the
Clarks and CL Management, (b) dissolution of both CL Management and Clark
Learning Properties, and (c) an accounting in conjunction with dissolution. R. at 56.
After limited discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment on
July 20, 2005, arguing that all of GLFP's claims were derivative, and that GLFP
had not complied with Utah Code Annotated §§ 48-2a-1001 to 1006, which govern
derivative actions. R. at 192. On August 15, 2005, Defendants filed a separate
motion for summary judgment asserting that GLFP lacked standing or capacity to
bring its claims because it purportedly had assigned its interests in Clark Learning
Properties and CL Management to two different entities. R. at 279-80.
On November 7, 2005, Judge Iwasaki issued his summary judgment
decision, finding a question of fact concerning the assignment issue, R. at 434,2 but
holding in Defendants' favor with respect to the derivative nature of Plaintiff s
2

Given the district court's finding, the assignment question is not an issue in this
appeal.
3

claims, id. at 436. However, Judge Iwasaki did not enter judgment in favor of
Defendants at that time. On November 14, GLFP promptly moved for
reconsideration of the summary judgment decision with respect to its judicial
dissolution claim, R. at 467, and also sought leave to amend its Complaint to assert
its other claims on a derivative basis, R. at 439-41. On April 5, 2006, Judge
Iwasaki denied the motion to reconsider, declared the motion to amend "moot,"
and enteredfinaljudgment in favor of Defendants. R. at 575-76; 581-82. GLFP
timely filed a Notice of Appeal on May 5, 2006. R. at 590-91.
B.

Statement of Facts.

The issues in this case arise from the extended and often contentious
business dealings between Ms. Learning and her brother, Mr. Clark, and their
respective families. The Learnings and Clairks have been business partners in a
variety of entities for many years.
Defendant CL Management, Ltd. ("CL Mgmt") is a Utah limited partnership
established in 1983, with Mr. Clark as the managing general partner, R. at 265
although plaintiff alleged that Mr. Clark assigned or delegated most of his
responsibilities and duties to his son, H. Scott Clark. R. at 2. Defendant Clark
Learning Properties, Ltd. ("CLP") is a Utah limited partnership established in
1988. Its primary business is ownership of various real estate interests. R. at 265.
CL Mgmt is the managing general partner of CLP. As a result, the Clarks
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effectively function as general partners of CLP, as well. Id. CL Mgmt owns 10%
of CLP. Id. The remaining 90% is owned equally by the Learning family through
Plaintiff GLFP (short for "George Learning Family Partnership") and the Clarks,
through an entity called HCFP (the "Howard Clark Family Partnership"). R. at
264-65.
CL Mgmt's primary business is to manage and operate various real estate
holdings, including those of CLP. R. at 265. In addition to CLP, CL Mgmt is the
managing general partner of at least two other Clark/Learning entities - CL
Investment Company and Modulus Investment Company. Id. The Clarks also
have other properties and businesses for their sole benefit, which are also managed
by CL Mgmt. R. at 265-66. Although members of the Learning family have
ownership interests in CL Investment and Modulus, GLFP is not an owner of
CL Investment, Modulus, or any of the other entities operated by the Clarks for
their sole benefit.
For all essential purposes, CL Mgmt is owned equally by the Clark and
Learning families, who fund CL Mgmt primarily via various fees charged by the
Clarks for the management of the families' holdings, including: (a) property
management fees; (b) asset management fees; and (c) leasing fees. R. at 265.
CL Mgmt's overhead and expenses, in theory, should be shared equally by the
Learning and Clark families. Id. Accordingly, each family has traditionally paid

5

equal amounts (e.g., via CLP) for the administration and overhead of CL Mgmt
and should receive equal distributions (e.g., to GLFP and HCFP). (See Exhibit 1
of the addendum which is a chart based on the foregoing facts and is helpful in
defining the various companies and ownership interests.)
In its Complaint, GLFP alleged that many of the fees assessed by CL Mgmt
were excessive. R. at 4. In response to inquiries by the Learnings, the Clarks had
stated that the fees charged were not excessive, but in any event, equally benefited
the Clarks and Learnings because of their joint ownership status in CL Mgmt. Id.
However, since the Clarks commingled the activities of numerous properties and
interests - in which the Learnings have no ownership, but the Clarks do - within
the business of CL Mgmt, the Clarks used the improper fees to help fund their own
interests, to the detriment of GLFP specifically, and thereby the Learnings
generally. Id. In other words, because of CL Mgmt's involvement with entities
that benefit the Clarks alone, and not the Learnings, the Learnings have been
paying for a disproportionate share of expenses, and more importantly, receiving
less in distributions to GLFP, thereby effectively subsidizing the management of
properties and businesses from which they derive no benefit. This fact was the
genesis of the lawsuit, and a key aspect of Plaintiff s Complaint. R. at 4-5. This
fact also was fundamentally misunderstood by the district court.

6

In their summary judgment pleadings, Defendants argued that GLFP was not
charged any of the excessive fees by CL Management, which instead were directly
charged to CLP. R. at 209. Thus, Defendants argued that GLFP's alleged claims
were derivative (i.e., belonged to CLP) in that only CLP was directly harmed by
the fees. R. at 194-95. In opposition, GLFP asserted that the Clarks had
commingled the activities of numerous properties and interests and, in doing so,
had used the improper fees to help fund their own interests, to the direct detriment
of GLFP by way of reduced distributions. R. at 255-56,265-66. Thus, the direct
harm to GLFP was that, contrary to the Clarks' representations, the excessive fees
did not equally benefit the Clarks and GLFP via distributions from CL Mgmt;
adequate distributions did not take place because of the commingling and use of
the fees to benefit the Clarks' separate business entities. R. at 256, 258.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court wrongly classified all of plaintiff s claims as derivative,
ignoring both the unique harm suffered by GLFP and the non-derivative nature of
claims for judicial dissolution. Alternatively, the district court ignored Supreme
Court case law recognizing an exception to derivative-claim requirements when a
limited partner challenges the actions of a general partner in a closely-held
partnership.

7

The district court also erred in refusing to reconsider its decision to allow
plaintiff to proceed on its dissolution claim, which was not based solely on
excessive fees. Further, refusal to reconsider did not render plaintiffs motion to
amend moot. Plaintiff should have been allowed to assert futility of demand, and
pursue those claims classified by the district court as derivative.
ARGUMENT
I.

GLFP ASSERTED DIRECT, NON-DERIVATIVE CLAIMS AGAINST
DEFENDANTS.
The district court's initial summary judgment order largely consists of a

synopsis of the parties' respective positions. R. at 434-36. No case law is cited.
The court's reasoning is set forth in two sentences:
[Although GLFP may ultimately experience the indirect
effect of the alleged wrongdoing, the undisputed
evidence indicates that the only direct claims are held by
the Partnership. Moreover, since this action has not been
brought as a derivative one, Plaintiffs claim for an
accounting and for dissolution lack any basis.
R. at 436.
A.

GLFP's Damage Claim Was Direct, Not Derivative.

Contrary to the district court's decision, GLFP's damage claims against CL
Mgmt and the Clarks (based on breach of fiduciary duty) were for injuries uniquely
suffered by it, and not by CLP. By definition, such claims are not derivative.
In shareholder litigation, which is directly analogous to actions by limited
partners, Utah defines derivative claims as follows:
8

A derivative action must necessarily be based on a claim
for relief which is owned by the stockholder's
corporation . . . . The stockholder, as a nominal party,
has no right, title or interest whatsoever in the claim itself
- whether the action is brought by the corporation or by
the stockholder on behalf of the corporation.
Richardson v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 638 (Utah 1980). In contrast to
derivative claims, to maintain a direct action a shareholder "need show only an
injury to him or herself that is distinct from that suffered by the corporation."
Aurora Credit Services, Inc. v. Liberty West Development, Inc., 970 P.2d 1273,
1280 (Utah 1999) (citing PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

§ 7.01, cmt. C) (hereafter,

ANALYSIS

"PRINCIPLES")).

If GLFP's claim was only that CL Mgmt had charged CLP excessive fees, to
the equal detriment of the Clarks/HCFP and Leamings/GLFP as owners of CLP,
the resulting legal claims could be classified as derivative and belonging to CLP.
But the excessive fees were merely a starting point, and not the lynchpin, of the
Complaint. As noted, the wrongful conduct at issue was the commingling and
misdirection of the excessive fees by CL Mgmt for the benefit of other Clark
entities and properties, with the result that GLFP received less distributions than
would otherwise have been true, and the Clarks received a benefit that GLFP did
not. (See addendum, Exhibit 2, for a chart depicting these facts.) The district
court's summary judgment order did nothing to analyze this issue, but merely held
in a conclusory fashion that the claims were derivative. R. at 436. Indeed, the
9

district court does nothing to explain why commingling and misdirection of assets
by a general partner is not direct harm to a limited partner.
GLFP did not merely rely on the allegations in its Complaint on this issue.
Despite having had only limited discovery, GLFP retained an expert to analyze
Defendants' documents and records. His initial report revealed that the excessive
fees disproportionately benefited the Clarks and their businesses to the detriment of
GLFP. R. at 272-73. The district court's decision makes no mention of this report.
Defendants did not cite a single case holding that commingling and
misdirection of assets by a general partner is not directly harmful to the limited
partner that is denied the benefit of those assets. Defendants' focus was on where
the funds originated - i.e., from CLP's payment of excessive fees - and not on
where the fees went once received by CL Mgmt. The injury was unique to GLFP
because the other primary owners of CL Mgmt were either a Clark entity (HCFP)
or Howard Clark himself, who were receiving the benefits of the commingling and
misdirection of assets.
B.

GLFP's Requests for Dissolution and An Accounting Were Not
Derivative Claims.

Just as importantly, the district court failed to analyze GLFP's requests for
an accounting and judicial dissolution. Defendants failed to cite any law holding
that actions for an accounting and dissolution are derivative; indeed, such actions
are classically brought directly by a minority owner. See, e.g., Stewart v. K&S
10

Co., 591 P.2d 433 (Utah 1979) (individual shareholder brought direct action for
accounting); Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129 (Utah App. 1989) (a limited partner
brought direct action for dissolution of a limited partnership). Again, the district
court's holding began and ended with the issue of excessive fees, and failed to
distinguish these claims by GLFP from its request for damages. In the district
court's view (implicit, but not directly stated), a limited partner may not seek
dissolution based on a harm suffered by the partnership at the hands of the general
partner. No case law was cited for this proposition.
GLFP moved for partial reconsideration of the initial summary judgment
decision, arguing both that a claim for dissolution is not derivative, and that this
claim was not based solely on the excessive fees charged to CLP. See, e.g., UTAH
CODE ANN.

48-2a-802; Kalabogias v. Georgou, 627 NE 2d 51, 57 (111. App. 1993);

12B FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5915.20 at 478-79 (2000) ("An
action which has for its purpose compelling the directors to dissolve a corporation
is representative in character, since the right to determine whether a corporation
shall be dissolved resides in the majority of the shareholders and not in the
corporation itself."). In contrast, by their nature derivative actions are brought to
maintain the continued and profitable existence of a partnership.
Minority shareholders may sue a company directly for its dissolution when
they can establish that those in control have acted in a manner that is oppressive,
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illegal, or fraudulent. Kalabogias, 627 NE.2d at 53. A limited partner has the
right to seek dissolution upon a showing of oppressive conduct which has the
effect of excluding that partner from taking part in the affairs of the partnership.
See, e.g., Compton v. Paul K. Harding Realty Co., 285 NE 2d 574, 581 (111. 1972)
(holding that there was ample evidence showing a record of arbitrary, overbearing,
and heavy-handed conduct to justify finding of oppression and thereby supporting
dissolution); White v. Perkins, 189 SE 2d 315, 318-19 (Va. 1972) (finding
oppressive conduct where the majority shareholder/officer had excluded other
shareholders from participating in the affairs of the company and had used the
company for his own benefit).
GLFP's Complaint alleged that Defendants had failed to hold timely,
regular, and proper partnership meetings and failed to provide adequate financial
and business documents. R, at 3-4. In fact, the Learnings often had to request
partnership meetings in order to obtain financial and business information. Id.
Despite these requests, meetings were held so sporadically and access to financial
information had been so limited that GLFP was unable to track revenues and
expenses to compare with the fees and distributions. Id. Likewise, the Complaint
alleged that no partnership meeting of CLP had been held since September 15,
2004 (nearly 6 months at the time the complaint was filed) and at the time of that
September meeting, financial records were not up-to-date and agenda items were
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ignored or glossed over. Id. GLFP further alleged that minutes of meetings, when
and if distributed, did not accurately reflect what had occurred. Id. In essence,
GLFP and the Learnings had been excluded not only from participating in CLP and
CL Mgmt, but from being able to effectively monitor and evaluate the activities of
these businesses.
In the briefing on its motion to reconsider, GLFP submitted an affidavit from
Merline Learning indicating that the problems alleged in GLFP's initial Complaint
had not been resolved. R. at 562-63. Ms. Learning had not been notified of a CLP
partnership meeting in 2005 and had not received minutes of any such meeting. R.
at 563. Further, GLFP had not received any distributions from CL Mgmt or CLP
since April 2005, despite a large accumulation of cash. Id. Under Utah's Revised
Limited Partnership Act, § 48-2a-802, judicial dissolution is allowed when a
partnership is not reasonably able to carry on business in conformity with the
partnership agreement or there is a failure to comply with the requirements of
§§ 48-2a-101 etseq. GLFP's initial claim for dissolution specifically cited the
failure of both CL Mgmt and CLP to comply with requirements of the Limited
Partnership Act, particularly § 48-2a-305 (inspection of records - right to
information), § 48-2a-503 (sharing of profits and losses), and § 48-2a-504 (sharing
of distributions). R. at 3-4.

13

Having a second opportunity to address the issue, the district court again
ignored these allegations and again focused on the allegation that excess fees were
charged by CL Mgmt to CLP; as such, any claim based on the fees was derivative,
according to the district court, and therefore all of Plaintiff s claims were
derivative since they were all based on the same disputed conduct. R. at 575. This
combination fact finding/legal conclusion was contrary to the record, and contrary
to basic summary judgment standards. The district court thus erred, in the
alternative, regarding GLFP's request for judicial dissolution and an accounting
(the latter was requested as part of dissolution). Even if GLFP's damage claim was
derivative, dismissal of the entire case was unwarranted.
II.

TO THE EXTENT GLFP'S CLAIMS ARE DEEMED DERIVATIVE,
UTAH LAW PERMITS SUCH CLAIMS TO BE BROUGHT BY GLFP
RATHER THAN VIA CLP.
To the extent any of GLFP's claims could be considered to be derivative,

Defendants were not entitled to summary judgment based on that finding alone.
Instead, the district court should have addressed whether GLFP nonetheless should
have been allowed to assert these claims. In fact, the cases Defendants cited to the
district court were to this effect. In particular, Defendants relied upon Aurora
Credit and Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, 991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999). Both
of these cases recognize that, under some circumstances, shareholders in a closelyheld corporation (or limited partners in a closely-held limited partnership) may
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bring claims directly which are by their nature derivative. Aurora, 970 P.2d at
1280-81; Arndt, 991 P.2d 588-89. These two decisions essentially adopted the
following recommendation of the American Law Institute:
In the case of a closely-held corporation ..., the court in
its discretion may treat an action raising derivative claims
as a direct action, exempt itfromthose restrictions and
defenses applicable only to derivative actions, and order
an individual recovery, if itfindsthat to do so will not
(i) unfairly expose a corporation or defendants to a
multiplicity of actions, (ii) materially prejudice the
interest of creditors of the corporation, or (iii) interfere
with the fair distribution of the recovery among all
interested persons.
PRINCIPLES

§ 7.01(d).3 The PRINCIPLES thus recognize that, with limited

exceptions, closely-held business entities should be treated differently with respect
to derivative-claim requirements. Here, there was no showing by Defendants that
any of the three exceptions applied; therefore, GLFP should have been allowed to
pursue the asserted claims.
The district court's response to GLFP's argument was to shift the summary
judgment burden to the non-moving party, i.e., GLFP. The district court stated that
"the evidence in the record simply does not support such an exception and, further,
no proper Rule 56(f) motion for continuance has been filed." R. at 436. The
evidence in the record, however, was undisputed that the entities in question were
3

While questioning its scope, the Supreme Court's recent decision - Dansie v. City
ofHerriman, 2006 UT 23, f 15, 134 P.3d 1139, 1144-45 (Utah 2006) - does not
negate the holding of Aurora Credit.
15

closely held, and all the key parties were before the court, such that a multiplicity
of actions or unfair distribution of a recovery were not issues. Further, a court
should not place the burden on the limited partner or minority shareholder to prove
that none of the exceptions cited in the

PRINCIPLES

apply. The general partner -

given his or its control over the partnership - should be required to demonstrate
that an exception - e.g., prejudice to creditors - requires the claim to be pursued
derivatively, rather than directly.
The Utah Supreme Court recognized in Aurora Credit that "the rationale for
requiring an action to proceed derivatively is often absent in a closely-held
corporation, where it is unlikely that there is a disinterested board because the
majority shareholders are often the corporation's managers." 970 P.2d at 1280.
Other courts have allowed derivative claims to be brought directly by a shareholder
or limited partner by drawing a comparison between the closely-held corporation
and a partnership:
Because of the fundamental resemblance of the close
corporation to the partnership, the trust and confidence
which are essential to this scale and manner of enterprise,
and the inherent danger to minority interests in the close
corporation, we hold that stockholders in the close
corporation owe one another substantially the same
fiduciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that
partners owe to one another.
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, 367 Mass. 578, 592-93, 328
N.E.2d 505, 515 (1975).
16

This comparison is particularly applicable to a closely-held limited
partnership like the ones at issue here. Both CL Mgmt and CLP are closely-held
limited partnerships. GLFP alleged that the Clarks, as managing general partners
of both entities, acted for their own benefit (and that of the Clark family) and to
the detriment of GLFP (and the Learnings). As managing general partners, the
Clarks were the equivalent of controlling shareholders in a close corporation, i.e., it
would have been the Clarks' decision as to whether CLP would bring any action
for derivative harm. Accordingly, requiring that a damage claim be brought in the
name of CLP places GLFP in an untenable position and exalts form over
substance. Therefore, even if the district court were correct in classifying all the
asserted claims as derivative, it should have permitted GLFP to pursue these claims
under established Utah law. SeeArndt, 991 P.2d at 589. See also Simon v. Mann,
373 F. Supp. 1196, 1198-1200 (D. Nev. 2005) (discussing rationale for closecorporation exception for bringing derivative claims).
III.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION TO AMEND.
In light of the district court's determination that the asserted claims were

derivative, GLFP moved to amend its Complaint to comply with the court's
decision. Specifically, GLFP sought leave to allege that it was entitled to pursue
the derivative claims consistent with § 48-2a-1003, which provides:

17

In a derivative action, the complaint shall set forth with
particularity the effort of the plaintiff to secure initiation
of the action by a general partner or the reasons for not
making the effort.
This statute effectively recognizes the "futility of demand" exception to
bringing derivative claims in the name of the limited partnership when the general
partner controlling the partnership has a conflict in asserting those claims. Here,
GLFP's Complaint, on its face, showed that the Clarks had a conflict because their
conduct (both individually and through CL Mgmt) was the basis for the asserted
claims. R. at 3-5. These allegations were sufficient to establish futility of demand.
See 13 FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA CORPORATIONS § 5965 at 87 (2004) ("if the plaintiff
pleads sufficient facts to create a reasonable doubt that the directors are
disinterested or independent, futility of demand has been established . . . . ) ; id. at
74-75 ("Courts have generally excused demand if it would be directed to
individuals who, by reason of hostile interest or participation in the alleged
wrongdoing, cannot be expected to institute litigation on behalf of the
corporation.").
GLFP's motion to amend noted that Mr. Clark had acknowledged the
conflict by offering to "involve respected third party experts for assessment of the
merits of any purported derivative claims." R. at 440. Nothing in the case law
supports a requirement that a limited partner must agree to have a third party
evaluate derivative claims when the general partner has a conflict. To the contrary,
18

the Utah statute recognizes that a limited partner may bring the action and assert
the derivative claim when it is futile to request the general partner to do so. Cf.
Peller v. Southern Co., 911 F.2d 1532, 1537 (11th Cir. 1990) (in appointing special
committee to evaluate claim, board of directors conceded its conflict and therefore
demand was excused).
The district court failed to address the merits of the motion to amend.
Instead, the district court erroneously concluded that, because it had denied the
motion for reconsideration regarding the dissolution claim, the motion to amend
was moot. R. at 576. No rationale was offered for this conclusion, which was
clearly erroneous. GLFP in no way linked the motion for reconsideration with the
motion to amend. In fact, the whole basis for the motion to amend was the district
court's determination that the asserted claims were derivative in nature. R. at 440.
In that respect, denial of the motion to reconsider buttressed the motion to amend,
rather than rendered it moot. The motion to amend, in seeking to assert derivative
claims, could not have been moot when the district court reiterated its conclusion
that all the claims at issue were derivative. The district court's finding of mootness
is a non sequitur.
CONCLUSION
In this case, GLFP (and the Learnings) had facially valid complaints
regarding the actions of Defendants, whether labeled derivative or otherwise. The

19

district court's decision requires minority shareholders or limited partners, such as
GLFP, to present claims to the alleged wrongdoers for consideration and action.
This perverse outcome should be rejected.
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully requests that the district court's summary
judgment be reversed and this matter be remanded for full discovery and trial on
the merits.
Dated this 7th day of September, 2006.
HOLLAND & HART LLP

Brent E. Johnson, 7558
Katherine Norman, 9573
Holland & Hart LLP
A. Biruce Jones, #11370
Holland & Hart LLP
Attorneys for Appellant
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Addendum

Exhibit 1

CL MANAGEMENT, LTD.
GENERAL PARTNERS:

Howard Clark- 10%
MB Management, Inc.

2%

LIMITED PARTNERS:

GLFP - 47%
H C F P - 39%
GL Marital Trust

2%

Assets:
No real property

CLARK LEAMING
INVESTMENT C O .

MODULUS
INVESTMENT Co.

CLARK LEAM ING
PROPERTIES

GENERAL PARTNER:

GENERAL PARTNERS:

GENERAL PARTNER:

CL Management-2%

CL Management - 2%
Woodbury Trust - 1%
G. Richard Young - 1%

CL Management - 10%
LIMITED PARTNERS:

LIMITED PARTNERS:

HCFP - 4 5 %
GLFP - 45%

LIMITED PARTNERS:

H C F P - 45%
J, Learning Trust - 22.5%
S. Pollish-22.5%

Assets:
Have been sold

HCFP - 24%
Woodbury Trust - 24%
Riuchard Young - 24%
J. Learning Trust - 12%
S. Pollish- 12%

Assets:
Have been sold

CLARK LEAMING, INC.

Merline Leaming - 50%
Howard Clark-14%
Betty Clark-36%

Assets:
Phoenix (land and building)
Sacramento (building only)
Santa Monica (building only)
Montcry (building only)

Exhibit 2

CLARK LEAMING
INVESTMENT C O .

CLARK
LEAMING
PROPERTIES

MODULUS
INVESTMENT

FEES

Pass through, less expenses for
Clark/Leaming entities

GEORGE LEAMING
FAMILY PARTNERSHIP

("GLFP")
Direct harm to GLFP
from reduced or nonexisent distributions

Co.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

GLFP, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership,

^ H Q V - 7 2005

Plaintiff,

DepuMClerk

MEMORANDUM DECISION
vs,

Case No. 050902498

CL MANAGEMENT, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership; CLARK
LEAMING PROPERTIES, LTD., a
Utah limited partnership; and
HOWARD S. CLARK and H SCOTT
CLARK, individuals,

Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI
November 3, 2005

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Assignments and
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment Re: Derivative Claims.
The Court heard oral argument with respect to the motions on
October 31, 2005.

Following the hearing, the matters were taken

under advisement.
The Court having considered the motions, memoranda, exhibits
attached thereto and for the good cause shown, hereby enters the
following ruling.
Turning initially to the motion regarding assignments,
Defendants assert it has now been established that GLFP in 2002
assigned, entirely, its limited partner interests in CL

GLFP v. CL MANAGEMENT

Page 2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Management and Clark Learning Properties, Ltd., to the wholly
separate parties of Sumerlea, Ltd. and Ming, Ltd.

Given these

assignments, it is Defendants' position GLFP has no standing to
pursue any of the claims set forth in the Complaint.

Thus,

contend Defendants, CL Management is entitled to summary judgment
on all claims.
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing Merline and Jan Learning
vigorously assert that no assignment ever took place.1
Moreover, asserts Plaintiff, the evidence shows that the Consent
documents were never fully executed and the Consents were
intended as consents to assignments that were never consummated.
Indeed, contends Plaintiff, one of the alleged assignees, Ming,
was never formed.

Furthermore, the Consent documents were never

delivered to Plaintiff, as required for valid acceptance.
Even if the Consents were otherwise valid as assignments, it
is Plaintiff's position Defendants should be estopped to rely
upon them because of their inequitable action in concealing the
executed Consent documents from Plaintiff while extracting
continued cash calls and fees from Plaintiff.

Merline contends that as part of her estate planning, she
contemplated using two partnerships to divide the assets among
her daughters. Ming with her daughter Jan and Sumerlea with her
daughter Susan. Plaintiff, however, contends said plans were
ultimately abandoned.

GLFP v. CL MANAGEMENT
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After reviewing the record in this matter, the Court finds
disputed issues of fact with respect to whether the Consents were
properly executed and whether or not delivery of any acceptance
of consent occurred, preclude summary judgment on this basis at
this time.
Turning next to the motion regarding derivative claims,
Defendants argue Plaintiff is seeking to assert, directly, claims
that are as a matter of law, derivative.

Indeed, contend

Defendants, Plaintiff in its Complaint and discovery responses
identifies two factual theories that allegedly support all of its
claims.

These theories, assert Defendants, are that Defendant CL

Management, as the general partner, (1) mismanaged certain real
property holdings owned by Clark Learning Properties Ltd.; and (2)
charged improper and illegal fees to Clark Learning Properties,
Ltd.

Both of these theories, contend Defendants, are derivative

and can only support derivative claims for relief.
The aforementioned in mind, it is Defendants' position
Plaintiff failed to comply with Utah law regarding the assertion
of derivative claims.

For example, Plaintiff has not set forth

any efforts made to secure the action desired from the general
partner, the reasons the effort failed, or why they chose not to
make the effort.
In light of the forgoing, Defendants seek summary judgment

GLFP v. CL MANAGEMENT
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on the theories noted above, as well as Plaintiff's attempted
direct claim for breach of any fiduciary duties and such related
damage theories.
Plaintiff opposes the motion arguing its claims are not
derivative, rather, such are for injuries directly suffered by
GLFP.

Indeed, contends Plaintiff, its claim is that the harm to

GLFP is direct in that, contrary to the Clarks' representations,
the excessive fees do not equally benefit the Clarks and GLFP-via
distributions from CL Management.

Rather, contends Plaintiff,

the Clarks have used the improper fees to help fund their own
interests to the detriment of Plaintiff and derivatively to the
Learnings.2

In other words, asserts Plaintiff, because of CL's

involvement with entities that benefit the Clarks alone, the
Learnings have been paying a disproportionate share of expenses
and receiving less in distributions, thereby effectively
subsidizing the management of properties from which they derive
no benefit.3

2

As background, Defendant Clark Learning Properties ("CLP")
is a Utah Limited Partnership. CL Management ("CL") is a Utah
Limited partnership and Defendant Howard Clark is the Managing
Partner of CL. CL is the Managing General Partner of CLP. CL
Owns 10% of CLP. The remaining 90% of CLP is owned equally by
the Learning family through Plaintiff GLFP (short for George
Learning Family Partnership) and the Clarks, through an entity
called HCFP (short for the Howard Clark Family Partnership).
3

In the Complaint Plaintiff states " . . . the Clarks have
commingled the activities of numerous properties and interests-in
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Indeed, to the extent any of GLFP'S claims could be deemed
derivative, it is Plaintiff's position Utah law permits such
claims under circumstances such as this, where the shareholders
are part of a closely held corporation.
After, again, reviewing the record in this matter, the Court
agrees that GLFP is seeking to assert, directly, claims that are,
as a matter of law, derivative.

Indeed, although GLFP may

ultimately experience the indirect effect of the alleged
wrongdoing, the undisputed evidence indicates that the only
direct claims are held by the Partnership.

Moreover, since this

action has not been brought as a derivative one, Plaintiff's
claims with respect to an accounting and for dissolution lack any
basis.

Finally, although Plaintiff argued it should be excepted

from the derivative requirement, given the closely held nature of
corporation, the evidence in the record simply does not support
such an exception and, further, no proper Rule 56(f) motion for
continuance has been filed.
Based upon the forgoing, Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment Re: Derivative Claims is granted.

which the Learnings have no ownership but the Clarks do-with the
business of CL Management. In doing so, the Clarks have used the
improper fees to help fund their own interests, to the detriment
of Plaintiff and, derivatively, to the Learnings." Complaint at
13.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GLFP ltd., a Utah limited
partnership,
Plaintiff,
MINUTE ENTRY
Case No. 050902498

vs.

Honorable GLENN K. IWASAKI
CL MANAGEMENT, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership; CLARK
LEAMING PROPERTIES, LTD., a
Utah limited partnership; and
HOWARD S. CLARK and H. SCOTT
CLARK, individuals,

April 5, 2006
FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

Defendants.
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to
Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration, Plaintiff's Motion to
Amend, Defendant's Motion to Strike and Defendant's Motion for
Entry of Judgment, submitted for decision on March 23, 2006.
Although oral argument was requested, the Court is not persuaded
such would be of assistance in this matter, nor is a hearing
required by the applicable Rules. Accordingly, the ruling with
respect to the motions will be addressed in the following Minute
Entry.
Turning to the merits of the motions, after reviewing the
record in this matter and although a claim for dissolution is not
typically derivative, it is clear GLFP's claim is based upon the
premise that CL Management, as general partner, charged and
collected improper fees from Clark Learning Properties, Ltd. No
independent and direct basis for recovery has been alleged by
GLFP. Accordingly, while characterized as a dissolution claim,
the Complaint, nonetheless, is founded upon a derivative theory
of recovery (fee mismanagement).
Based upon the forgoing, Plaintiff's Motion for
Reconsideration is, respectfully, denied. Accordingly,

<rrc

Plaintiff's Motion to Amend and Defendant's Motion to Strike are
moot. The Court will execute the submitted Order and Judgment.
DATED this

r

day of April, 2006.
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial-District

APR - 5 2006
Jeffery S. Williams (6054)
NELSON CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN
68 South Main Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Facsimile: (801) 363-3614

SALT LAKE COUNTY
By

_ _ .
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GLFP, LTD., a Former Utah limited
partnership,
Plaintiff,

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT REGARDING DERIVATIVE
CLAIMS AND DENYING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT REGARDING
ASSIGNMENTS

vs.
CL MANAGEMENT, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership; CLARK LEAMING
PROPERTIES, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership; and HOWARD S. CLARK
and H. SCOTT CLARK, individuals,

Civil No.: 050902498
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.

The defendants CL Management, Ltd, Clark Learning Properties, Ltd, Howard S. Clark
and H. Scott Clark filed two motions for summary judgment, which came before the Court for
hearing on October 31, 2005. These motions were fully briefed, and extensive argument was
offered to the Court. At the hearing, the defendants were represented by Mr. Jeffery Williams,
and the plaintiff GLFP, Ltd was represented by Mr. Bruce Jones and Ms. Katherine Norman.

Having considered the arguments of counsel and the briefing previously provided to the
Court, the Court hereby Orders as follows:
1.

The Court denies the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the

contested assignments between the plaintiff and the third party entities of Ming, Ltd and
Sumerlea, Ltd. The grounds for denying this motion for summary judgment are set forth in the
Court's memorandum decision dated November 7, 2005.
2.

The Court grants the defendants' motion for summary judgment based on the

existence of only derivative claims asserted in the plaintiffs complaint. The grounds for granting
this motion for summary judgment are set forth in the Court's memorandum decision dated
November 7, 2005. A judgment consistent with this portion of the Order was entered by the
Court.
DATED this '_ day of ^

, 20Q^
BY THE*

Honorable Glenn K. Iwasaki
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING DERIVATIVE CLAIMS AND DENYING .
SUMMARY JUDGMENT REGARDING ASSIGNMENTS was served in the manner
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/ / , day of November, 2005, upon:
indicated below this<_f_

Brent E. Johnson
Katherine Norman
Holland & Hart, LLP
60 East South Temple, Suite 2000
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-1031

(VIA HAND-DELIVERY)

A. Bruce Jones
Patricia Dean
Holland & Hart, LLP
555 17th Street, Suite 3200
P.O.Box 8749
Denver, CO 80201-8749

(VIA U.S. MAIL)

Jeffery S. Williams (6054)
NELSON CHRISTENSEN & HELSTEN
68 South Main Street, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Telephone: (801) 531-8400
Facsimile: (801) 363-3614

FILED BISTRJGT COURT
Third Judicial District

Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GLFP, LTD., a Former Utah limited
partnership,

JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.
CL MANAGEMENT, LTD., a Utah
limited partnership; CLARK LEAMING
PROPERTIES, LTD., a Utah limited
partnership; and HOWARD S. CLARK
and H. SCOTT CLARK, individuals,

Civil No.: 050902498
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki

Defendants.

The Court, pursuant to Rule 54 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, hereby enters
judgment in this matter based on the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendants.
The Court finds that all of the claims set forth in plaintiffs complaint are derivative
claims, and/or are premised on derivative claims for relief. Thus, the Court accordingly directs
judgment in favor of the defendants, in that the plaintiff has improperly asserted such claims

STf\

directly and in violation of Utah statutory law. See Utah Code Ann. §§48-2a-1001 through 1006,
and Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah. 991 P.2d 584 (Utah 1999). The grounds and rationale
supporting this judgment are set forth in the Court's Memorandum Decision dated November 7,
2005.
This judgment does not preclude the plaintiff from pursuing proper derivative
proceedings consistent with the requirements of Utah law, and to the extent such proceedings are
otherwise appropriate.
Pursuant to Rules 54(d) and 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, fees and/or costs in
the amount of $

are awarded to the defendants.

DATED this _ 1 _ day of ^Tlfit
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